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The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity. W. B. Yeats, “The Second Coming” 1928.
These despairing lines from W.B. Yeats, written in 1928, resonate with current worries
that electoral democracies in Hungary, Poland, Germany, and elsewhere are producing
politicians who seek to undermine the very institutions that put them into
office. Sławomir Sierakowski, “Interview with Adam Michnik: Europe’s  New Eastern
Question,” Political Critique, December 1, 2017, 
http://politicalcritique.org/cee/poland/2017/ps-insider-interview-europes-new-eastern-
question-slawomir-sierakowski-adam-michnik/. On the Alternative for Deutschland,
Germany’s far right party, see: Jefferson Chase, “AfD: What you need to know about
Germany’s far-right party,” Deutsche Welle, September 24, 2017,
https://www.dw.com/en/afd-what-you-need-to-know-about-germanys-far-right-
party/a-37208199. Countries from the United States under Donald Trump to Brazil
under the forthcoming presidency of Jair Bolsonaro raise similar worries. See, for
example:  Ernesto Londoño and Shasta Darlington, “Jair Bolsonaro Wins Brazil’s
Presidency in a Shift to the Far Right,” New York Times, October 28, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/world/americas/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-
election.html . This paradox can afflict even established democracies. Those who win
elections want to remain in power after the next election. They have an incentive to
undermine the credibility of the opposition and to use the tools of political power to do
so. Incumbents who aggrandize power and demonize opponents can produce
situations where office holders are less and less threatened by credible organized
opponents. The opposition, in turn, seeks to gain power not only by espousing
alternative policies but also by questioning the integrity and competence of
incumbents.
In a stable representative democracy institutional and legal constraints curb and
domesticate tendencies toward autocratic power. These constraints have popular
support and are a fundamental aspect of the nation state and a source of patriotic
pride over and above the identities of the particular people and parties holding power.
The citizenry has what Jürgen Habermas calls Verfassungspatriotismus or
“Constitutional Patriotism”. Jürgen Habermas, “Eine Art Schadensabwicklung. Die
apologetischen Tendenzen in der deutschen Zeitgeschichtsschreibung, in:
Historikerstreit. Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der
nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung, (München, 8th edn., Piper 1991). The term was
first used by Dolf Sternberger in 1979, and was developed  by Jürgen Habermas in a
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somewhat different sense. For an overview of the concept, its link to the German past,
and its broader normative value  see: Jan-Werner Müller, „On the Origins of
Constitutional Patriotism“ Contemporary Political Theory  5:278-296 (2006). For its role in
constitutional debates in Poland see Dorota Szeligowska, The Dynamics of Polish
Patriotism after 1989: Concepts, Debates, Identities, Ph. D. Dissertation, Central European
University, Budapest, Hungary, 2104. In such polities, support for incumbents would
ebb away if the government tried to undermine fundamental constitutional principles
—either basic institutions or the protection of rights.
If citizens do not have that attitude, however, incumbents may be able to interpret,
amend or ignore the text in ways that undermine liberal democratic values.
Furthermore, not all constitutional texts provide a strong institutional bulwark against
autocracy. Nominal institutional checks and balances in the text are not sufficient; they
have to function adequately and have to be seen by citizens as a key to political
legitimacy. Comparing Hungary and Poland, Laurent Pech and Kim Scheppele write
that the Polish government had to violate the constitution to achieve its aims while in
Hungary it could “create an illiberal state by amending the constitution every time it
was tempted to violate it.” Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, “Illiberalism Within:
Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU” Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 19: 3-
47 (2017) at p. 26.
Verfassungspatriotismus played an important role in the development of the Federal
Republic of Germany after the Second World War and continues to be invoked in the
face of rising right-wing parties. For example, former President Joachim Gauck, both in
his inaugural speech in 2013 and in a 2017 speech at the end of his term, evoked
Verfassungspatriotismus as an everyday reality designed to uphold the values
embedded in the German constitution.  During his end of term speech on 18 January
2017, Gauck referred to Habermas’ concept of Verfassungspatriotismus:
http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Joachim-
Gauck/Reden/2017/01/170118-Amtszeitende-Rede). He addressed the rising fear of
right-wing tendencies and appealed to the society to stand up jointly to fight for the
values enshrined in the constitution. He described Verfassungspatriotismus not only as
a theoretic concept developed by scholars, but also as a concept of everyday reality
(Lebenswirklichkeit). He also referred to the concept in his inaugural speech on 23
March 2013 (available here, in English: 
http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/EN/JoachimGauck/Reden/2012/0
3/120323-Swearing-In-Ceremony.html).
But we need to be more specific. What institutions are important checks on the
autocratic tendencies of incumbents, how do they work, and how might determined
politicians undermine these institutions in their own interest? Are there notable
weaknesses in the constitutional structures of Hungary and Poland and even in the
German Grundgesetz that make them vulnerable when popular support for particular
individuals and parties clashes with liberal democratic values. I focus here on several
that are important but that have not often been the focus of commentary. These are of
two kinds: first, institutions of “horizontal accountability”,  Guillermo O’Donnell,
“Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies,” in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond,
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and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Self- Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New
Democracies (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999). and second, those that enhance the
democratic legitimacy of policymaking procedures inside the executive branch.
The first, horizontal, category, includes, not only the courts—including the prosecutorial
service and specialized administrative or subject matter courts—but also oversight
institutions such as ombudsmen, supreme audit offices, electoral commissions, anti-
corruption commissions, and media oversight bodies.  The second category obligates
the executive to give public reasons for its policies. It links the democratic legitimacy of
delegated executive and agency policymaking to procedures for gathering the views of
the public and of organized stakeholders such as business, labor, and civil society,
outside of the political party framework. If, in contrast, ordinary citizens and civil
society organizations are not part of the policymaking process, they may lose
confidence in these processes and become disillusioned with democracy. Of course,
other factors such as job market prospects, income and wealth levels,  See Maurizio
Bussolo, Maria E. Dávalos, Vito Peragine, and Ramya Sundaraam, Toward a New Social
Contract: Taking on Distributional Tensions in Europe and Central (Washington DC: World
Bank Group, 20180) available at:
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/202171468299130698/Towards-a-new-
social-contract, pp. 189-196 . Maps 4.1 and 4.2 on pages 192-193 document the way at-
risk poverty measures correlate with votes for extremist parties in Hungary and
Poland. the quality of daily life, and the level of security and trust in others may
overshadow individuals’ views of government policymaking legitimacy, but perceptions
of government inclusiveness, honesty and competence will likely affect citizens’ views
of the legitimacy of those who exercise power.
My basic claim, which builds on my research in Hungary and Poland, is that the
transition to democracy and the market in these countries underemphasized reforms
that would involve citizens and civil society groups in reforming the delivery of
government services and the regulation of the market economy.  Susan Rose-
Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy: Building Accountable Government in Hungary and
Poland (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
Reforms tended to respond to European Union mandates, not reflect domestic
concerns. Levels of distrust in both national governments and in EU institutions remain
high. But see, Demos, Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself (London: Demos, 2017)
https://www.demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Nothing-to-Fear-but-Fear-Itelf-
final-short.pdf . This British think-tank report on public attitudes, showed that Polish
citizens have far more trust in the European Commission than citizens in France,
Britain or Germany—almost 60% compared with 35-40%  (p.37). However, 60% of Poles
distrusted their national governments, more than citizens of Germany and Britain
(p.38). (The French were particularly distrustful of their government). Even when there
were strong policy arguments for certain reforms, citizens often viewed them as
imposed from outside in an almost colonial relationship. Sociological studies document
perceptions of the unfairness of the allocation of wealth during the transition.
György Csepeli, Antal Orkény, Mária Székelyi, and Ildikó Barna, “Blindness to Success:
Social Psychological Objectives Along the Way to a Market Economy in Eastern Europe,”
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in János Kornai, Bo Rothstein, and Susan Rose-Ackerman, eds., Creating Social Trust in
Post-Socialist Transition (NY; Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) pp. 213-240. These perceptions
may have opened the door for the victory of authoritarian parties in recent years.
At first, the constitutions of Hungary and Poland were the old socialist constitutions
amended and given legal bite. Poland first made temporary amendments to the
socialist constitution, called the Small Constitution of  1992 and then promulgated a
new constitution in 1997,
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Poland_1997.pdf. On the socialist roots
of the first post-transition Hungarian Constitution see Peteri Zoltan “Constitution
Making in Hungary” Acta Jur. Hng. 36: 149 (1994), p.153. Eventually, Poland and Hungary
issued new constitutions in 1997 and 2011, respectively. In Poland the new document
retained some features of the socialist past. On the socialist roots of the post-
transition Polish Constitution see Daniel Cole, “Poland’s 1997 Constitution in Its
Historical Context” (Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Paper 589, 1998) pp. 28-
30. In Hungary the 2011 constitution reflected Viktor Orbán’s efforts to entrench his
legacy in institutions and aspirational statements.  Hungarian Constitution of 2011,
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Hungary_2011.pdf . See also András
Bozóki and Dániel Hegedűs “An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the
European Union”, Democratization 25 (7): 1173-1189 (2018).
The Constitutional Courts in Hungary and Poland have not been much concerned with
enhancing the public accountability of executive policymaking. At first, most of the
justices appointed to the new constitutional courts had private law backgrounds to
avoid those tainted by association with the prior regime. This meant that few had
experience in public law issues related to state functioning. These justices might
aggressively protect the rights of the individual, but they had little interest in the
institutional framework or democratic legitimacy of policymaking in the
executive. Rose-Ackerman, 2005, pp. 64-70. Going forward, to the extent that current
governments have compromised these courts’ independence, the justices are unlikely
to pursue those institutional concerns in the present. Both countries are left with weak
checks on executive power.
Of course, much of the public law of the socialist period was not appropriate for the
new market-dominated states that emerged.  But the process of reform did not
produce a legal/political system strongly committed to public involvement in
government policymaking. In part, that was a legacy of the socialist past where public
“participation” often meant “volunteer” projects that ate into individuals’ scarce free
time on weekends and holidays. The “civil society” groups that existed were umbrella
bodies sanctioned by the state, such as the Young Pioneers, Birdlife in Hungary and
Gesellschaft für Natur und Umwelt (GNU) in East Germany, and societies for women
and the elderly. On the role of the Young Pioneers in GDR society see: Emmanuel
Droit “From Identity to Appearances: Clothing and Political Identity in the GDR. The
Case of the Young Pioneers' Neckerchief (1949–1989)” (Berlin, Revue d’histoire
moderne & contemporaine. No. 59, Vol. 2(2, pp. 108-143; On the “voluntary”
associations in Hungary before 1990: Rudolf Andorka “Changes in Hungarian Society
Since the Second World War” (Macalester International, Vol. 2, Article 12, 1995), pp.127-
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128; also: European Commission “Study on Volunteering in the European Union,
Country Report Hungary”, 2010, p. 1
http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/doc1024_en.pdf; European Commission “Study on
Volunteering in the European Union, Country Report Poland”, 2010, p. 1 
http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/national_report_pl_en.pdf.  The GNU mater merged
with its West German counterpart to become Naturschutzbund Deutschland e. V.
(NABU) which today the biggest and most influential society promoting environmental
protection.)) After the transition, a number of new groups arose, some supported by
outside funding, for example, the Environmental Management and Law Association
and World Wildlife Fund. However, with low personal incomes and little tradition of
private philanthropy, the local organizations presently struggle to survive and to push
their reform agendas.  Rose-Ackerman, 2005, pp. 163-191; European Commission
Country Report Hungary, 2010, p. 1,11,12 and Country Report Poland, 2010, p. 1.
Furthermore, the type of civil-society involvement that most easily came to mind
during the transition was a corporatist model derived from labor/management
committees, as exist in Germany. This model can be useful in some contexts, especially
if the organizers are willing to extend the definition of “union” broadly—for example, to
include a group representing pensioners in a debate over pension reform, as
happened in Poland. But such a search for stakeholders could freeze membership in
policy advisory groups at the point of transition. Early efforts in Hungary and Poland to
reform labor laws included associations of workers and firms that became increasingly
unrepresentative as the economic basis of society changed. For example, in Hungary a
union of university professors and an association of small cooperative businesses
served on the committee advising the government for many years although they
represented increasingly small shares of the economy.  The discussion here derives
from Rose-Ackerman, 2005, pp. 131-137. Furthermore, labor union membership is
currently about 10% in both countries, down from the already low totals in the recent
past. Thus, dialogues on labor/management issues with unions and employers have
often been unrepresentative of both labor and management.  The latest official
statistics of 2015 show only 9% of workers in unions. See Edit Németh; Rainder Girndt
Zwischen Resignation und Aufbruch – Aktuelle Entwicklungen bei den ungarischen
Gewerkschaften (Budapest:Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Studie 2018), pp. 1,7. In Poland
membership is 10%  according to CBOS Polish Public Opinion Research Center, Trade
Union Membership and Opinions about their activities  (2013), summary in English:
https://www.cbos.pl/EN/publications/reports/2013/062_13.pdf , p.1; full report: 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/14574-20180919.pdf , p.7.  These
percentages represent a steep drop from 2002 when the percentages were estimated
at 20-25% in each country (Rose-Ackerman, 2005, pp.131-137). Even if the government
seeks advice from outside, the composition of the groups is often hard to defend. This
situation means that when autocratic trends emerged out of political parties nominally
committed to democracy, there were only a few counterweights with sufficient
credibility, organizational stability, expertise, and funding to push back effectively.
Bodies with explicit oversight functions exist in Hungary and Poland. However, they
have had difficulty maintaining independence and competence. The controversy over
court-packing in the Polish Constitutional Court is well known, The developments are
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outlined in the blog posts of Maciej Kisiliowski in Politico.
https://www.politico.eu/author/maciej-kisilowski/. See, for example, “Poland:
Authoritarian, Not Patriotic,” November 28, 2017. See also Laurent Pech and Kim Lane
Scheppele, “Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU” Cambridge Yearbook
of European Legal Studies 19: 3-47 (2017) at but efforts to undermine other oversight
bodies are ongoing and some date from well before the current crisis. Any
parliamentary system would have structural difficulties with independent oversight
bodies because of parliamentary sovereignty. An overview of Hungarian and Polish
oversight institutions as of 2005 is in Rose-Ackerman, 2005, pp. 55-99. Even in Poland,
with its separately elected president, independent bodies are not always independent
enough to provide effective oversight. Ombudsmen and Comptrollers General are
single individuals reporting to the parliament. Even if they can only be removed “for
cause”, they have fixed terms and budgets that depend upon the parliament. A supra-
majority may be required to appoint a replacement, but that may leave the office
vacant for an extended time.  Thus, in Hungary one ombudsman’s office remained
vacant for months as parties vied to appoint a friendly candidate. Rose-Ackerman,
2005, p. 80-81.  Conversely, under one-party control, the government can appoint a
pliable flunky, as has recently happened in Hungary, where previous incumbents had
good reputations for independence. The ombudsman’s official name is the
Commissioner for Fundamental Rights (Alapvető jogok biztosa). Eva Balogh “László
Székely, the new ombudsman”, May 05, 2014, Hungarian Spectrum,
http://hungarianspectrum.org/2014/05/12/laszlo-szekely-the-new-ombudsman/.  The
comptroller is a Fidesz operative. See:  “Hungarian State Audit Office’s Assault on
Democracy,” Free Press, January 9, 2018,
http://hungarianfreepress.com/2018/01/09/the-hungarian-state-audit-offices-assault-
on-democracy/ , and “Strangely the Hungarian State Audi Office is Satisfied with Air
Quality,” Levegö Munkacsoport, January 30, 2018,
https://www.levego.hu/en/news/magyarorszag-az-egyik-legrosszabb-levegoju-europai-
orszag-de-az-asz-elegedett/
Multi-member bodies provide a stronger constraint on autocrats if terms are long and
staggered, but the longer the autocrat stays in power the less of a constraint exists. Of
course, the appointment process could be depoliticized with a committee of
professionals selecting the members. This approach has been used to select judges in
a number of countries, although here too the political and business connections of
those on the committee can undermine its independence, and their influence may be
opaque and hard for the public to counteract.
In short, the institutions for public participation and for independent oversight have
serious weaknesses in both Hungary and Poland. Some of the weaknesses are
structural and embedded in each country’s constitutional frameworks. Others are
linked to the transition from the socialist past. In the transition from socialism,
administrative law lacked a democratic imprimatur and could provide only a weak
check on government policymaking. Natural law and the protection of rights provided
important protections for individuals but did little to help create the institutions of a
functioning regulatory/welfare state. Remnants of the past have created tensions. For
example, public providers of health care and education have been under pressure as
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limited resources clashed with rising expectations, creating corrupt workarounds. The
socialist governments’ undermining of civil society left Hungary and Poland with
political parties but weak not-for-profit and advocacy sectors. Like most of Western
Europe, labor unions only represent a minority of the workforce. Formal institutions of
oversight such as ombudsmen and audit offices have, at times, provided checks, but
they are vulnerable to capture by determined autocrats seeking to avoid oversight.
Germany with its strong national government and civil society organizations should
have more space to push back against authoritarian tendencies, although its federal
structure may lead to pockets of democratic authoritarianism that will be difficult to
control. However, dissatisfaction with the transition has also been prevalent in eastern
Germany where the laws of the Federal Republic were simply extended to cover the
region. After reunification, bookshops in East Berlin stopped stocking Marx and added
shelves of Federal Republic statutory texts so the new citizens would know the rules
that now governed their lives. Even though the imposition of Bundesrepublik law went
along with massive financial subsidies, resentment remained. Philip Oltermann
“’Revenge of the East'? How anger in the former GDR helped the AfD”, The Guardian,
Sepember 28, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/28/is-germanys-
election-result-the-revenge-of-the-east also: Steffen Kröhnert, Reiner Klingholz “Not am
Mann: Von Helden der Arbeit zur neuen Unterschicht? Lebenslagen junger
Erwachsener in wirtschaftlichen Abstiegsregionen der neuen Bundesländer“, (Berlin,
Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung 2007). The Constitutional Court and
the other specialized courts extended their jurisdiction to the East. The Basic Law was
applied without formally promulgating a new constitution. Some analogize
reunification to a takeover under which one legal system replaced another. However,
that belief may be exaggerated. Stephen Jaggi argues that the revolutionary ideas of
citizens’ movements in the East, as institutionalized in the Roundtable Draft
Constitution, had an impact. He claims that the timing of the passage of Article 20a of
the Grundgesetz, establishing environmental protection as an objective state goal,
reflects that influence. Stephan Jaggi, The 1989 Revolution and Its Impact on Unified
Germany’s Constitutional Law: The Forgotten Revolution? (Oxford: Nomos/Hart, 2016), pp.
162-170)) Although Article 20a was the only formal amendment with such a
connection, his assessment of Constitutional Court decisions in the areas of land
reform, gender equality, abortion, and housing finds that they incorporate ideas
prominent in the East among opponents of the DDR regime into an “intergenerational
synthesis” that helped to produce a unified German state.  Id. at pp. 171-236. The
concept of Intergenerational Synthesis derives from Bruce Ackerman, We the People,
Foundations (Cambridge MA; Harvard University Press, 1991).
So far the European Union has been of little help in counteracting democratically
chosen leaders with authoritarian platforms. Although a vote in the EU Parliament in
September did condemn Hungary’s anti-democratic behavior by a two-thirds vote, the
ultimate effect of that move remains in doubt.((Patrick Knight and Steven Erlanger,
“Hungary’s Democracy in Danger, E.U. Parliament Decides,” New York Times, September
14, 2018. For more background see Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, “Illiberalism
Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU” Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies
19: 3-47 (2017) (criticizing EU responses and suggest some legal responses). András
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Bozóki and Dániel Hegedűs “An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the
European Union”, Democratization 25 (7): 1173-1189 (2018). They call Hungary a “hybrid
regime” and argue that “the EU functions as both “regime sustaining” and “regime
constraining”, is ways that are “regime legitimizing” for Hungary” p.1174. The actions
that the EU might take—economic sanctions and limits on EU voting rights—are
unlikely to have a major effect and might even backfire if they stoke local resentments.
Those who voted for authoritarian leaders could vote them out under the right
conditions, but those with power are working to make that difficult. The task for
reformers is to make a space for candidates effectively to challenge incumbents, to
enhance the role of oversight institutions, and to encourage public participation in
policymaking. The goal is to move states toward institutions that evoke “constitutional
patriotism” and that undermine demagogic appeals. This is not an easy task given the
self-reinforcing nature of shifts toward authoritarianism. My hope is that those living
through the troubling developments in Hungary, Poland, and Germany can provide
some fresh ideas for a constructive way forward. Perhaps those regional experiences
can also help worried liberal democrats in the Philippines, Brazil, and even the United
States.
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